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Abstract: Several CEE countries are members of the EU and, thus, participate in the single 
financial market. To realize advantages, a successful economic integration assumes 
convergence processes. The study focuses on the aspects of financial integration of CEE 
banks into the European single banking market, not forgetting the impacts of global financial 
crisis in 2008 which caused both liquidity shortage and increasing insolvency. The 
methodology is a literature review, on one hand, data survey with comparative analysis, on 
the other. 
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Introduction  
The crucial question of creation of a single market is whether can this process unite the 
partial markets and, thus, increase the completion pressure to spur cost-competitiveness and 
inexpensiveness. The financial sector is especially important in regard of overall economic 
costs and growth since every companies and almost every citizen in the EU must use banking 
services. The EU-accession of the group of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) member 
states was a considerable extension of the single financial market, too. Success of their overall 
financial integration is significant issue for the EU. That is why this study analyses some 
aspects of CEE financial convergence. 
Although, in the second decade of the 21
st
 century, the CEE commercial banking sector 
operates in market economies as usual, the region has a legacy of the command economy 
lasted until 1989. Benczes (2008) summarized this impact of past in a relatively not long ago 
liberalized, privatized banking sector which was shifted towards two-tier system and opened 
for foreign investors. Latter ones have played a majority owner role in the undercapitalized 
transition region. Besides, the CEE markets are characterized by small scale, low degree of 
financial penetration, low degree of product diversification. This process created individual 
characteristics for the vulnerability and stability of the CEE banking sector. (Benczes, 2008: 
128-138) As Jokipii and Lucey (2002) wrote, in the 2000s, the CEE banking sectors were 
over the privatization, deregulation, liberalization of licensing, and capitalization by foreign 
investors. The 1990s already brought market clearing by bank failures, especially in case of 
under-capitalized, domestic small banks. 
The regional past and specialties resulted a relatively dynamic expansion of crediting from 
a low activity base. This credit growth was accelerated by the economic catching-up of the 
region. (Kiss et al., 2006) The favourable global economic and financial circumstances and 
the medium term growth of CEE region led to risky exposure by the lending activity 
measurable in credit/deposit ratio. As Benczes (2008:135) worded, the CEE banking sector 
had to face the challenge to ‘find the appropriate balance between an increased lending 
activity and to maintain a stable functioning’. 
Small scale, fragmented market structure in CEE is typical not only because of the 
fragmented country structure of the region, but also because of various national financial-
fiscal-monetary policy mixes and strategies. Sovereign risks and interest rate policies affected 
differently the structure of loans and deposits. Before the global and euro crisis, all CEE 
countries have had national monetary autonomy. Some of them chose the strategy to pass it to 
the European Central Bank as soon as possible (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia), or 
planning to do it soon (Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania). Some others have strived – at least 
since 2010 – to reserve the national currency (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary). Some 
monetary authorities applied strict and high interest rates, some did not. Some country had 
higher foreign reserves, other had lower in the eve of the crisis etc. These policy differences 
modified, differentiated the credit and deposit structure of the countries. Because of the 
differences of national risk premium and interest rate policy, in those countries (Hungary, 
Baltics, Romania, Ukraine) who kept high rates beside giving opportunity for foreign 
currency loans, the depreciation of emerging market currencies by global panic found their 
households and firms deeply indebted in euro, Swiss franc and some other foreign currencies. 
The countries which kept their risk premium close or under the euro zone in market rates had 
insignificant loan exposure to foreign exchange. Thus, it is expectable, that the financial 
contagion was not uniform in the region. 
The study analyses the price-based and quantity-based aspects of financial integration with 
focus on CEE member states. First, the theory and methodology of financial convergence is 
surveyed which is complemented with a regional literature review. The CEE empirical 
outlook incorporates a cross-border capital flow and exposure explanation to enlighten the 
risks, too, originated in a strong integration. To understand the institutional circumstances of 
the financial integration process, an overview about the structure of the CEE banking market 
is explicated. The indicators of financial integration are the inter-bank rates and the market 
share which are analyzed in this study. The hypothesis of the analysis is that financial 
convergence is measurable in the CEE countries’ banking sector by price- and quantity-based 
indicators. 
 
1. Theory and empirics of financial integration 
Beale et al. (2004) define the financial integration with a trinity of single set of rules on 
financial instruments and services, equal access to financial instruments and services, and 
equal treatment in the market. Beale et al. (2004) and Baltzer et al. (2008) distinguish 
different ways of measures of financial integration: price-based, news-based and quantity-
based measures. The price based measures analyze ß-convergence regression about the local 
yields and benchmarks. The news-based measures analyze the correlation between single 
market news and local yields. The quantity based measures analyze cross-border penetration 
of banking and loans. The ECB (2015) used the price-based and the quantity-based indicators 
to measure the financial integration. In case of banks, this methodology applied composite 
index of cost of borrowing, composit rates on small, medium and large bank loans and 
composit rates on deposits as price-based indicators, besides, non-domestic share in total 
assets and loans, number of non-domestic institutions, and share of cross-border loans and 
deposits as quantity-based indicators. 
Haan et al. (2010) distinguish the dimensions of financial integration by the market, by the 
regulator and by the community of the industry. The market dimension means cross-boarder 
comparability and competition of yields, loans and assets. The regulatory dimension contains 
the single rules and single licenses. The community dimension sums the industrial level 
harmonization in technology and standards in a united market. Haan et al. (2010) analyzed the 
distribution of banking assets, the convergence on retail banking interest rates, market 
concentration and number of banks, and number of cross-border M&A. 
About the credit market, convergence was measured by Adam et al. (2002) who calculated 
ß- and σ-convergence on 3-month interbank rates, and by Dahl et al. (2008) who made a panel 
data analysis.   
Although, in the second decade of the 21
st
 century, the CEE commercial banking sector 
operates in market economies as usual, the region has a legacy of the command economy last 
until 1989. Benczes (2008) summarized this impact of past in a relatively not long ago 
liberalized, privatized banking sector which was shifted towards two-tier system and opened 
for foreign investors. Latter ones have played a majority owner role in the undercapitalized 
transition region. Besides, the CEE markets are characterized by small scale, low degree of 
financial penetration, low degree of product diversification. This process created individual 
characteristics for the vulnerability and stability of the CEE banking sector. (Benczes 2008: 
128-138)  
Dahl et al. (2008) introduced the concept of “activity-level convergence” as a framework 
for assessing the results of adaptive period of bank activities after the implementation of some 
directives of single banking regulation. The measuring of convergence is applied for product 
line and financial structure of customers’ loans, deposits and securities. Their methodology is 
to calculate ratios of loans, assets, securities, deposits, equity to each other and make a panel 
regression analysis with means and standard deviations. 
First of all, it should be clarified why do banks invest into foreign country. Bol et al. 
(2002) summarized the literature answering this question. Berger et al. (2001) assume a global 
advantage of multinational banks in comparison to domestic banks as the multinationals have 
better technology to price and monitor the risk, and better practices to treat moral hazard. 
Goldberg and Saunders (1981), Bearley and Kaplanis (1996), Konopielko (1999), Buch 
(2000), Moshirian (2001), Williams (2002) state that banks are following their customers. 
Also, there is a group of authors (Claessens et al 2000, Hymer 1979) saying that the banks are 
seeking efficiency, higher profitability what can be achieved by extending the market or 
number of customers abroad. Lesnik and Haan (2002) measured strong positive correlation 
between the liberalization of banking market and the banking FDI moving into the 
developing, transiting countries. E.g. Claessens et al (2000) or Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2000) modelled the tax advantages seek by foreign banks. Namely, the banking FDI can be 
classified by reasons to the OLI-paradigm (Dunning 1979) or to the market – efficiency – 
resource – strategic asset seeking approach (Szentes 2002). Soussa (2004:3) identified the 
following determinants of banks' FDI into emerging countries, according to Clarke et al. 
(2001):  
“(i) shifts in regulatory opportunity and environment; (ii) increased economic integration 
between home and host countries; (iii) information costs; (iv) profit opportunities; (v) factors 
relevant to specific institutions; and (v) factors relevant to the home markets of acquiring 
institutions.” 
 Papi and Revoltella (1999), Mathieson and Roldos (2001) found about CEE and other 
post-soviet  European countries that the ROE, NPL ratio, attitude of host country authority, 
liberalization of entry regulation were the significant factors of attractiveness. Naaborg (2007) 
found confused literature about efficiency and foreign ownership.      
The global procedures has been typical for the CEE bank sector just like 
transnationalization of ownership after liberalization of the national banking market. Thus, the 
dominant oligopolies in the CEE banking markets were backed by such big banks which has 
been considered to be too big to fail. Stern and Feldman (2009) explains that the too-big-to-
fail (TBTF) phenomenon means that the political decision makers bail out the big banks in 
case of their failure, because they fear from an extended bank crisis and sudden stop of 
crediting which can launch a general economic depression. The TBTF parent banks are 
important factors in the recapitalization of CEE banking sector as the losses were backed by 
parent banks' home governments. Financial integration of CEE countries is strongly related to 
the transnationalization of CEE banking sector. Haan et al. (2010:108-112) made a mix of the 
corporate transnationalization and the international integration theories. The CEE banking 
processes can be understood better by using their terms on drivers of financial integration. 
The market enforces the optimization, the scale efficiency and the technological and product 
innovation by the competition in the single European market. The collective actions of banks 
standardize the practices of the sector. (E.g. single standard payment systems in the inter-bank 
relations.) Meanwhile, the public actions – like FSAP, Banking Union etc. - standardize the 
regulation. The three drivers together caused measurable convergence in yields, over-night 
lending rates, retail banking interest rates, for example. (Haan et al 2010:198-119,223) 
The importance of measuring financial integration is explained by the benefits and the 
risks of a single banking market. The strong connections have efficiency effect through more 
intensive competition, on one hand, but negative spill-over is quickened in an integrated 
market, on the other hand. This negative spill-over is the financial contagion which is 
explained by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) as a coordination failure between deposits and their 
use. Besides, their approach is that bank runs are not accidentally, but self-fulfilling risks. In 
their early model, the vulnerability of banks was connected to the conflict between the 
withdrawal of deposits and the investments into illiquid (long term) assets.  Battacharya et a. 
(1998) worded it as bank runs triggered by adverse information. Allen and Gale (1998) 
concentrated on the strong correlation between business cycles and the bank runs by claiming 
financial crises an “inherent” part of the business cycle. Bandt and Hartman (2001) joined to 
the coordination failure explanation by defying the banking contagion as a systemic failure of 
fundamentally solvent institutions. This systemic risk is manifested by co-movements, cross-
market events and interdependences. (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). E.g. Manz (2002) or 
Schoenmaker (1998) distinguished two origins of such an exposure: One is the case when 
debtors’ failure results creditors’ failure, namely the contagion occurs through capital 
linkages. The other case is called information contagion when after the collapse of a bank or 
asset induces liquidation in mass, namely the depositors and investors rescue their money 
from similar banks and assets. (The latter one has a significant literature – Chen (1999), 
Acharya & Youlmazer (2003), – but this version has not been typical for the CEE banking 
sector under the period of global crisis started in 2008.) The contagion from capital linkages 
(or credit channel) is described by Schoenmaker as a ‘complex web’ of interbank linkages. 
Especially in a globalized financial market, banks hold international assets and liabilities what 
creates a geographical channel for contagion by global credit crunch. This is a typical cash-
flow contagion approach which derives the crisis from friction of maturity.  As Losoncz 
(2009) summarize the financial sector practice led to the crisis of 2007-2009, the preventive 
approach is very limited. Ex post, reaction on crisis means adjustment to the changed deposit 
withdrawal habit or to the increasing likelihood of default. The banks can try to reduce the 
volume of claims with a more limited lending, the credit/deposit ratio by collecting deposit 
and stop crediting, clean their balance sheet from defaulted credit, cut the operation cost, turn 
away from lending toward other banking activities etc. (Losoncz and Nagy, 2010). After the 
occurrence of crisis, the banks – which could survive – will have a very narrow and path-
dependent room for maneuver for a longer period.  
Jokipii and Lucey (2007) measured the contagion in CEE banking sector as a co-
movement of  national markets Their correlation coefficients indicate the persistence of 
banking contagion between the CEE countries – only Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. 
This analysis showed strong correlation in case of contagion effect from Czech Republic to 
Hungary and not in any other direction. This result was earlier recognized by Morzuch and 
Weller (1999) who strengthened the interesting fact, that a national financial crisis in 1990s 
did not really affect the neighboring CEE countries, namely regional bank runs did not cause 
cross-border contagion, even neither after liberalization. They also tried to find its reasons. 
Their model assumes that bank runs are launched by second generation crisis, namely, by 
speculation. The base of speculation is a continuous appreciation of financial assets from 
quick profit targeting capital inflow into the financial markets of an emerging market after 
financial liberalization. However, low cross-border contagion does not mean low financial 
integration since the undercapitalized CEE region has quickly found big, effective, prudent 
and well capitalized multinational banks with lower risk exposure. Besides, small local banks 
typically have no international linkages. This can get known from Gropp et al. (2009), who 
examined the European banking sector, and they found evidence for cross-border banking 
contagion only in case of large banks because small banks' cross-border exposure is 
insignificant. If there is no cross-boarder risk spill-over among the CEE sectors, there could 
be an assumption, that the risk is transferred between the CEE affiliates and the multinational 
parent banks. But this is neither typical. Árvai et al. (2009) concentrated on the cross-border 
interbank spill overs between Western and Eastern Europe. They recognized an asymmetric 
dependency of CEE countries on the Western European banks. The measured exposure of 
Western banks (except Austrian and Swedish ones) is small. The contagion effect is more 
likely if the lender is concentrating on the CEE region. The authors proved that the CEE bank 
crediting is very much affected by extra regional banks, namely, these countries are heavily 
exposed to Western European banks. 
Morzuch and Weller (1999:5-6) found that, besides the presence of multinational banks in 
CEE region, the followings lowered the contagion risk in the 1990s. This is a very instructive 
list as many of them was not true in the 2000s: 
- The high risk premium threatened from local borrowing. This did not remained 
true for the 2000s, since in some countries market rates got low, other countries 
circumvented the high national rates with authorization of foreign currency credit.  
- The foreign exchange appreciation which has been very typical in other emerging 
countries – mostly because of FX peg – did not happen in CEE countries, so the 
financial assets did not get overvalued. This characteristic was neither completely true 
for CEE in the 2000s as some countries used pegging (Baltics, Bulgaria), or the 
interest rate policy strengthened the national currency undue (Hungary, Romania). 
- Default risk was law because of economic prosperity. Before 2008 it was 
particularly true, but default risk was lower due to the high liquidity of the global 
markets. 
- Maturity risk from high share of short term loans what can result a quick wave of 
defaults, was not significant because of cautious high stocks of official foreign 
reserves. This was neither true in the 2000s. The general 20-30 percent depreciation of 
CEE national currencies fundamentally in both good an bad countries (except the 
strictly pegging Baltic countries and Bulgaria) indicated that the fast illiquidity was 
unexpected for the CEE nationals banks in the end of 2008. 
 
2. The structure and risk of CEE banking sector during the first years of integration. 
First of all, to understand the various contagion effect of global crisis, we have to know the 
pre-crisis characteristics of the CEE banking sector. Árvai et al. (2009) found significant 
inter-linkages within Europe. The CEE banking sector is very much depends on the Western 
European banks. In the CEE banking market, the financial risk exposure is concentrated to 
Austrian, German and Italian banks, and in case of Baltics to Sweden. The post-communist 
past of CEE  and SEE regions resulted aggressive banking strategies and fast extension of 
credits. From Árvai et al. (2009:7) calculation can be established, that the speed of credit 
extension was 43% in the Baltics and 15.5% in the V4 countries before the crisis, in 2004-
2007, as a cumulated change. in the transition and integration period. Árvai et al. (2009) 
observed inverse relationship between level of development and credit growth. But it is more 
important to recognize generally on CEE countries that the extension of credits were 
significantly faster than the growth of deposits. (see Árvai et al. 2009: fig. 4.) This created, 
finally, a credit/deposit ratio where the credits significantly exceeded the deposits what 
resulted interbank contagion risk, too. 
According to Raiffeisen (2013), the loans exceeded the deposits significantly before the 
crisis, what was followed by correction forced by the global markets. From this ratio, it can be 
foreseen, which countries had to face with serious balance-sheet contagion risk from 
uncovered credit defaults. This risk was multiplied by the FX factor in case of Ukraine, 
Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Belarus, Serbia. Beside, the countries with ratio under 100% 
faced the crisis with less fragile banking sector. 
Even though, the global crisis and the domestic debtors’ default made the CEE banking 
sector not attractive for investors, there were some changes in the ownership structure which 
even altered the foreign/domestic characteristic of the bank. (E.g. in 2013 in Hungary the 
Korean Hanwha Bank in Hungary was acquired by the Hungarian Evo Pro company, thus, it 
become a domestic bank, or Banco Popolare sold its affiliate to the domestic MagNet Bank, 
or the Bayerishe Landesbank sold its Hungarian MKB subsidiary to the Hungarian 
government, and the same happened with the Hungarian affiliate of DZ Bank, Takarékbank.) 
As the Bankscope data on bank were usually updated until end of 2012, the structural analysis 
was made for year of 2012 and took the owner in that year into account. In case of those CEE 
banks whose shares are publicly traded in the stock exchange, and that is why they have lot of 
foreign institutional or private investors in few percentage one-by-one, but has no foreign 
investor with significant leverage (min. 25% ownership), these CEE banks are classified to be 
domestic banks in their country of residence (OTP in Hungary, PKO Bank or Getin Noble 
Bank in Poland). Its rationale is that the foreign portfolio investments are made through the 
stock exchange trade of already existing shares and not via initial public offering.  
Small scale, fragmented market structure in CEE is typical not only because of the 
fragmented country structure of the region, but also because of various national financial-
fiscal-monetary policy mixes and strategies. Sovereign risks and interest rate policies affected 
differently the structure of loans and deposits. Before the global and euro crisis, all CEE 
countries have had national monetary autonomy. Some of them chose the strategy to pass it to 
the European Central Bank as soon as possible (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia), or 
planning to do it soon (Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania). Some others have strived – at least 
since 2010 – to reserve the national currency (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary). Some 
monetary authorities applied strict and high interest rates, some did not. Some country had 
higher foreign reserves, other had lower in the eve of the crisis etc. These policy differences 
modified, differentiated the credit and deposit structure of the countries. Because of the 
differences of national risk premium and interest rate policy, in those countries (Hungary, 
Baltics, Romania, Ukraine) who kept high rates beside giving opportunity for foreign 
currency loans, the depreciation of emerging market currencies by global panic found their 
households and firms deeply indebted in euro, Swiss franc and some other foreign currencies. 
The countries which kept their risk premium close or under the euro zone in market rates had 
insignificant loan exposure to foreign exchange. 
 
Figure 1. Share of foreign banks in total assets in CEE markets 
 
source: Raiffeisen (2013), EBRD 
 
Árvai et al. (2009) concentrated on the cross-border interbank spill overs between Western 
and Eastern Europe. They recognized an asymmetric dependency of CEE countries on the 
Western European banks, which strengthen also our assumption, that banking contagion is 
very much determined (softened) by the multinational foreign banks. The measured exposure 
of Western banks (except Austrian and Swedish ones) is small. From the historical figures of 
market share of foreign banks it is clear, that foreign ownership is determining in the CEE 
region, much beyond 50%, except Slovenia. This foreign share is important in two folds. On 
one hand, the strong connection to multinational banking opens indirect channel toward each 
other in the CEE region by affecting across the common lender parent bank. On the other 
hand, the relative big size of multinational banks made it possible to soften and prevent the 
mass failure of CEE banking sectors as these MNCs have had the liquidity to refund the lost 
equity of the banks and guarantee the deposits became uncovered by increasing non-
performing loans.   
In case of economic crisis, the public finances demand new types of tax base if fiscal 
balance is enforced by the credit money shortage of capital markets. The banking sector is one 
of the industries which can be a target of temptation of the government since banks work with 
money. In the CEE region, the banking tax and tax on financial transfers appeared since 2010. 
E.g. the Hungarian government tried to levy tax on banks turnover and transfer services very 
innovatively showing practice for Poland and others, besides, limited the banks’ opportunity 
to reload this burden on customers. Very typically the new taxes have been introduced as 
temporary public revenue implied by the crisis, but became sooner or later permanent unit of 
the public budget. Such kind of tax impact can raise the assumption that the equity restoration 
particularly connected to losses from tax liabilities. In practice, the European Commission 
(DG-Taxation) recommends the taxation on financial transfers. Hungary introduced a 
significant bank tax on turnovers in 2011, but a lower rate already existed since 2009. 
Slovenia has applied bank tax since August of 2011. Slovakia introduced a onetime tax in 
2012, but, not a surprise, it turned to be permanent in 2013 in a modified form. Poland 
introduced bank tax in 2014. In the rest of CEE countries bank tax is just a plan (Croatia, 
Romania, Bulgaria) or not part of governments’ taxation plans at all (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Czech Republic). 
The non-performing loans (NPL) are significant factor of banks assets and equity. The 
NPL ratio reduces the bank’s lending capacity via provisions. The assumption of the analysis 
is that the increasing NPL ratio forces the bank to decide the dilemma whether it wants to 
keep its lending capacity with capital increase or change the lending strategy and accept the 
reduced capacity. Fig. 2 shows that the NPL ratio of CEE bank sector increased sharply 
during the crisis. 
 
Figure 2. Share of Non-performing loans (horizontal axis) and foreign currency loans 
(vertical axis) from total loans, 2007-11 
 
Source: author’s composition from Raiffeisen (2013) calculation based on IMF and 
national bank data (dots = country + year, e.g. HR10= Croatia in 2010) 
 
Klein (2013) seeks the reasons of non-performing loans in CEE and SEE regions. As it is 
clear from his regression analysis, there is a not too strong, but significant negative correlation 
between the GDP growth and the increase of credit defaults. Namely, he found that recession 
is a factor of contagion. This paper tried to find connection between credit default and other 
macroeconomic indicators too, but these significances are questionable, or  many of them are 
not significant even at 10%. 
However, Klein (2013) found evidence that CEE debtors’ solvency is a little bit sensitivity 
for the recession of the euro zone. He concluded that, in case of the “the bank-level indicators, 
the estimations show that higher equity-to-assets ratio leads to lower NPLs, therefore 
confirming the “moral hazard” effect; and higher profitability (RoE) contributes to lower 
NPLs and suggests that better managed banks have, on average, better quality of assets. […] 
Unlike in other studies mentioned earlier, other bank-level indicators such as the bank size 
and expense-to-income ratio were not found to have significant impact. On the 
macroeconomic level, the results show that an increase in unemployment contribute to higher 
NPLs, thus validating the strong link between the business cycles and the banking sector’s 
resilience. In addition, both higher inflation and the depreciation of currency were found to 
increase NPLs.” […] About the global environement factos: „Higher volatility index and 
lower Euro area growth reduce the firms’ capacity to repay, perhaps because of higher rates 
in the international financial markets, which reduce the firms’ ability to rollover their debt, 
and because of lower export revenues. In addition, these two factors may also lead to lower 
external funding of the banks and therefore may result in negative credit growth […].” (Klein, 
2013:12) 
It is possible to draw some conclusions about the difference of countries indebted in 
foreign and those who did it in local currency according to the Deloitte (2012) data on growth 
of loans/GDP and growth of non-performing loans between 2004 and 2008. Although private 
loan to GDP ratio is comparable between Slovakia and Hungary, or between Poland and 
Romania, but the multiplication of non-performing loans is significantly faster by the crisis in 
case of Hungary and Romania financed with foreign loans. 
From Deloitte (2012), it gets clear, that the FX depreciation hit mostly the following 
countries by 20%-30% depreciation: Hungary, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. If we compare 
this with the ratio of foreign currency credit and external financing, it will be clear that these 
two factors strongly determined the banking contagion based on credit default risk. Besides, if 
we consider the pre-crisis highly overvalued HUF, ROL, UKR, HRK by high market rates, in 
comparison to euro rates, it can be understood how could the foreign currency loans became a 
toxic asset in these countries, while rest of CEE was effected only by other factors of credit 
default (global recession, national recession, unemployment). From market interest rates it is 
clear, that before the crisis, Romania, Croatia, Hungary had to compensate fundamental risks 
with high national market rates. (See: Eurostat data on FX and 3-months monthly market 
interest rates) Thus it was clear, that local actors turned toward FX credits with significantly 
lower market rates. According to Raiffeisen (2013), in case of ROE and ROA analysis, it is 
harder to connect the damage of banks to the FX impact. It is more likely that discretionary 
effects, just as banking tax e.g., or national recession factors determined the earnings much 
stronger.  
From the historical data of market share of foreign banks it is clear, that foreign ownership 
is determining in the CEE region, much beyond 50%, except the CIS countries and Slovenia. 
(See: Árvai et al. 2009: fig. 1, p. 6; Raiffeisen 2013) This foreign share is important in two 
folds. On one hand, the strong connection to multinational banking opens indirect channel 
toward each other in the CEE region by affecting across the common lender parent bank. On 
the other hand, the relative big size of multinational banks made it possible to soften and 
prevent the mass failure of CEE banking sectors as these MNCs have had the liquidity to 
refund the lost equity of the banks and guarantee the deposits became uncovered by 
increasing non-performing loans. 
About regional contagion, Árvai et al. (2009:5) remark that the larger is the dependence of 
a country in CEE from a lender (country) with big exposure, the higher is the likelihood of 
regional contagion. This thesis hints, also, to the CEE characteristic, that if we want to find 
regional contagion, it will not appear between CEE countries, but in the relation of CEE and 
high developed Western European lenders (as it was mentioned, mostly Austria, Germany and 
Italy). However, there are some regionally significant banks whose place of management and 
location is in a CEE member. Their exposure in the CEE region is relatively high, thus, they 
can be a channel of regional contagion. Árvai et al. (2009) – as mentioned above – examined 
the cross-border contagion in relation with common external lenders. The four significant 
external lender countries in CEE were found Austria, Germany, Italy and Sweden. Any from 
the three types of contagion (subsidiary insolvency, reduced lending through subsidiary, 
parent bank insolvency) through a Swedish parent bank is a threat only and exclusively for the 
three Baltic countries. In case of the three other external lenders, all of CEE countries have 
some contagion risk, but very variously. If Austria is the common lender, Croatia has 
extraordinary exposure, besides, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have considerable risk. In 
case of Italy, the exposure is generally minimal, but Croatia and Hungary is relatively 
outstanding. Germany as an external lender canalizes relatively small risk into the CEE 
region. Inward this minimal risk, Hungary and Croatia are more exposed and Romania, 
Russia and Poland have relatively significant index levels, too. 
 
3. Indicators of financial integration of CEE banks 
Price-based indicators 
The price-based indicators of financial integration are calculated from inter-bank interest 
rates. Mean and standard deviation of CEE, beside, the difference between euro zone rates 
and the mean of CEE rates. Every indicator, both in case of day-to-day and 3-month rates, 
shows convergence in prices. (See fig. 3 and 4) However, structural differences make these 
indicators sensitive for cyclical or crisis impacts as the standard deviation and the difference 
from euro rate show temporary extreme peak/trough from the trend of convergence, in 2009. 
The clustering of CEE countries by structure of loans in Kutasi (2015) explains the deviation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean, standard deviation and (euro zone – mean) of inter-bank rates, monthly 
data, 2004-2015, % 
a) Based on day-to-day inter-bank rate 
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b) Based on 3-month inter-bank rate 
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CEE mean and standard deviation are calculated from the non-euro EU member CEE 
countries’ data in a given year. Croatian data used only from 2013. “Euro – CEE” is the euro 
inter-bank rate reduced with CEE mean.  
Source: Eurostat, calculation by the author 
Quantity-based indicators 
From the historical figures of market share of foreign banks it is clear, that foreign 
ownership is determining in the CEE region, much beyond 50%, except Slovenia. This 
foreign share is important in two folds. On one hand, the strong connection to multinational 
banking opens indirect channel toward each other in the CEE region by affecting across the 
common lender parent bank. On the other hand, the relative big size of multinational banks 
made it possible to soften and prevent the mass failure of CEE banking sectors as these MNCs 
have had the liquidity to refund the lost equity of the banks and guarantee the deposits became 
uncovered by increasing non-performing loans.        
Fig. 5. Market share of foreign-owned banks in CEE and SEE countries 
 
Source: Árvai et al. (2009: fig. 1, p. 6), IMF Staff calculation from EBRD data 
Fig. 6. Foreign ownership in banking, % of total assets 
 
Source: Raiffeisen (2013), calculation from national banks’ data 
RU50 = over 50% foreign ownership in Russia, RU100= 100% foreign ownership in 
Russia 
However, if it is the turn to consider the integration process into the single financial 
market, it can be recognized that the post-crisis impact on banking sector is a slightly 
decreasing market share of foreign parents. Particularly individual losses, particularly policy 
intents explain the change in trend. (E.g. in 2013 in Hungary the Korean Hanwha Bank in 
Hungary was acquired by the Hungarian Evo Pro company, thus, it become a domestic bank, 
or Banco Popolare sold its affiliate to the domestic MagNet Bank, or the Bayerishe 
Landesbank sold its Hungarian MKB subsidiary to the Hungarian government, and the same 
happened with the Hungarian affiliate of DZ Bank, Takarékbank.) From international 
affiliates, these banks became local banks focusing on a thin slice of the national market cake. 
This tendency reduced the competition pressure on these national markets a little bit 
according to the quantity-based approach, and this phenomenon is against the aim of financial 
integration. 
 
Conclusions 
Several CEE countries are members of the EU and, thus, participate in the single financial 
market. In this study, the aim was to establish whether their financial integration is successful 
according to the terms of financial convergence. The hypothesis was that financial 
convergence is measurable in the CEE countries’ banking sector by price- and quantity-based 
indicators. The study focused on the price- and quantity-based aspects of financial integration 
of CEE banks into the European single banking market, not forgetting the impacts of global 
financial crisis in 2008 which caused both liquidity shortage and increasing insolvency. The 
methodology was literature review and data survey with comparative analysis. 
It was established that the crucial question of creation of a single market is whether can 
this process unite the partial markets and, thus, increase the completion pressure to spur cost-
competitiveness and inexpensiveness. The financial sector is especially important in regard of 
overall economic costs and growth since every companies and almost every citizen in the EU 
must use banking services. The EU-accession of the group of the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) member states was a considerable extension of the single financial market, 
too. Success of their overall financial integration is significant issue for the EU. That is why 
this study analyses some aspects of CEE financial convergence. 
The theory and methodology of financial convergence was surveyed to determine the 
price- and quantity-based approaches and indicators. Besides, the empirical review contained 
a cross-border exposure explanation which enlightened the risks originated in a strong 
integration. The overview about the structure of the CEE banking market concluded strong 
and robust foreign share in most of the CEE banking markets. The FDI motivations related to 
CEE banking were explained, too, by a broad literature review. 
In case of the empirical analysis about the financial integration, the following can be 
concluded: The price-based indicators (mean and standard deviation of CEE, the difference 
between euro zone rates and the mean of CEE rates based on day-to-day and 3-month rates) 
showed convergence of the CEE region prices. But it was also observable that structural 
differences made these indicators sensitive for crisis impact as the standard deviation and the 
difference from euro rate showed temporary divergence in 2009. 
The quantity-based approach concluded that foreign ownership is determining in the CEE 
region, much beyond 50%. This connection to multinational banking opens indirect channel 
toward each other in the CEE region by affecting across the common lender parent bank. 
Besides, the relative big size of multinational banks made it possible to soften and prevent the 
mass failure of CEE banking sectors as these MNCs have had the liquidity to refund the lost 
equity of the banks and guarantee the deposits became uncovered by increasing non-
performing loans. However, a weak sign of a turnaround was recognized in the financial 
integration process. The post-crisis impact moved the CEE banking sector toward a slightly 
decreasing market share of foreign parents. From international affiliates, some banks became 
domestic banks by market portfolio. The tendency is against the aim of financial integration 
by reducing the competition pressure. 
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